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ABSTRACT
We estimate risk aversion from the actual financial decisions of 2,168 investors in Lending Club (LC),
a person-to-person lending platform. We develop a methodology that allows us to estimate risk aversion
parameters from each portfolio choice. Since the same individual makes repeated investments, we
are able to construct a panel of risk aversion parameters that we use to disentangle heterogeneity in
attitudes towards risk from the elasticity of investor-specific risk aversion to changes in wealth. In
the cross section, we find that wealthier investors are more risk averse. Using changes in house prices
as a source of variation, we find that investors become more risk averse after a negative wealth shock.
These preferences consistently extrapolate to other investor decisions within LC.
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Theoretical predictions on investment, asset prices, and the cost of business cycles, depend
crucially on assumptions about the relationship between risk aversion and wealth.1 Although
characterizing this relationship has long been in the research agenda of empirical nance and
economics, progress has been hindered by the diculty of disentangling the shape of the utility
function from preference heterogeneity across agents and changes in beliefs over time. For
example, the bulk of existing work is based on comparisons of risk aversion across investors
of dierent wealth, which requires assuming that agents have the same preference function.
If agents have heterogeneous preferences, however, cross sectional analysis leads to incorrect
inferences about the shape of the utility function when wealth and preferences are correlated.
Such a correlation may arise, for example, if agents with heterogenous propensity to take risk
make dierent investment choices, which in turn aect their wealth.2 To both characterize the
properties of the joint distribution of preferences and wealth in the cross section, and estimate
the parameters describing the utility function, one needs to observe how the risk aversion of the
same individual changes with wealth shocks.
Important recent work improves on the cross-sectional approach by looking at changes in
the fraction of risky assets in an investor's portfolio that stem from the time series variation
in investor wealth (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009)).
The crucial identifying assumption required for using the share of risky assets as a proxy for
investor Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) in this setting, is that all other determinants of the share
of risky assets remain constant as the investor's wealth changes. One must assume, for example,
that changes in investors' beliefs about the expected return of risky assets, or about the returns
1See Kocherlakota (1996) for a discussion of the literature aiming at resolving the equity premium and low
risk free rate puzzles under dierent preference assumptions. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), for example, model
preferences with habit formation that produce cyclical variations in risk aversion, and decreasing relative risk
aversion after a positive wealth shock. Gollier (2001) shows that wealth inequality raises the equity premium if
the absolute risk aversion is concave in wealth.
2Guvenen (2009) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008) propose a model with preference heterogeneity that
endogenously generates cross sectional variation in wealth. Alternatively, an unobserved investor characteristic,
such as having more educated parents, may jointly aect wealth and the propensity to take risk.
2of unobservable components of wealth such as human capital, are uncorrelated with shocks
to nancial wealth. Attempts to address this identication problem through an instrumental
variable approach have produced mixed results: the estimated sign of the elasticity of RRA to
wealth varies across studies depending on the choice of instrument.3
The present paper exploits a novel environment to obtain unbiased measures of investor
risk aversion and relate them to investor wealth. We analyze the risk taking behavior of 2,168
investors based on their actual nancial decisions in Lending Club (LC), a person-to-person
lending platform in which individuals invest in diversied portfolios of small loans. We develop
a methodology to estimate the local curvature of an investor's utility function (Absolute Risk
Aversion, or ARA) from each portfolio choice. The key advantage of this estimation approach
is that it does not require characterizing investors' outside wealth. We exploit the fact that
the same individuals make repeated investments in LC to construct a panel of risk aversion
estimates. We use this panel to both characterize the cross sectional correlation between risk
preferences and wealth, and to obtain reduced form estimates of the elasticity of investor-specic
risk aversion to changes in wealth.
Our estimation method is derived from an optimal portfolio model where investors not only
hold the market portfolio, but also securities for which they have subjective insights (Treynor
and Black (1973)). We treat investments in LC as special-insight securities, with returns that are
correlated with other securities through a common systematic factor (Sharpe's Diagonal Model).
This implies that LC returns can be decomposed into a systematic component, correlated with
macroeconomic uctuations, and a pure idiosyncratic component. We use the idiosyncratic
component to characterize investors' preferences: an investor's ARA is given by the additional
expected return that makes her indierent about allocating the marginal dollar to a loan with
higher idiosyncratic default probability. Estimating risk preferences from the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of returns implies that the estimates are independent from the investors' overall risk
exposure or wealth. Moreover, by measuring the curvature of the utility function directly from
3See Calvet et al. (2009) and Calvet and Sodini (2009) for a discussion.
3the rst order condition of this portfolio choice problem, we do not need to impose a specic
shape of the utility function. We show that our method obtains consistent estimates for the
curvature of the utility function under alternative preference specications, such as expected
utility (EU) over wealth, EU over wealth and income, loss aversion, and narrow framing.
The average ARA implied by the tradeo between expected return and idiosyncratic risk
in our sample of portfolio choices is 0.037. Our estimates imply an average income-based Rel-
ative Risk Aversion (income-based RRA), a commonly reported risk preference parameter in
experimental studies obtained assuming that the investor's outside wealth is zero, of 2.85, with
substantial unexplained heterogeneity and skewness.4 We use experimental measurements of
risk aversion to benchmark our estimates because investors in our model face choices that are
similar to those faced by typical experimental subjects along important dimensions: Our model
transforms a complex portfolio choice problem into a choice between well dened lotteries of
pure idiosyncratic risk, where returns are characterized by a discrete failure probability (i.e.,
default) and the stakes are small relative to total wealth (the median investment in LC is $375).
The level, distribution, and skewness of the estimated risk aversion parameters are similar to
those obtained in laboratory and eld experiments.5 These similarities indicate that investors
in our sample, despite being a self selected sample of individuals who invest on-line, have similar
risk preferences to individuals in other settings.
Using imputed net worth as a proxy for wealth in the cross section of investors, we nd that
wealthier investors exhibit lower ARA and higher RRA when choosing LC loan portfolios.6 Our
preferred specication, which corrects for measurement error in the wealth proxy using house
prices in the investor's zip code as an instrument, obtains an elasticity of ARA to wealth of
-0.059, which implies a cross sectional wealth elasticity of the RRA of 0.94.7
4The income-based RRA, often reported in the experimental literature, is dened as ARA  E[y], where E[y]
is the expected income from the lottery oered in the experiment.
5See for example Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997), Holt and Laury (2002), Choi, Fisman, Gale and
Kariv (2007), and Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2007b).
6Net worth is imputed by Acxiom as of October 2007. Acxiom is a third party specialized in recovering
consumer demographics based on public data.
7Although the wealth-based RRA is not directly observable, we compute its elasticity from the following
relationship: RRA;W = ARA;W +1;where RRA;W and ARA;W refer to the wealth elasticities of RRA and ARA,
4The results demonstrate that there is a link between heterogeneity in risk preferences and
wealth in the cross section. Existing empirical evidence on this link, which is increasingly relevant
for modeling asset prices, is inconclusive. When the risk aversion parameters are estimated from
the share of risky and riskless assets, the sign of the correlation between risk aversion and wealth
is sensitive to the denition of wealth and the categorization of assets into risky and riskless
(see, among others, Blume and Friend (1975), Cohn, Lewellen, Lease and Schlarbaum (1975),
Morin and Suarez (1983), and Blake (1996)). Guiso and Paiella (2008) and Cicchetti and Dubin
(1994) avoid this problem by estimating risk aversion from answers to an hypothetical lottery
and data on insurance against phone line troubles, respectively. These studies nd, as we do, a
positive cross sectional correlation between Relative Risk Aversion and wealth.
To characterize the shape of the utility function for the average investor, we estimate the
elasticity of risk aversion to changes in wealth in an investor xed-eect specication. As a
wealth shock, we use the decline in house prices in the investor's zip code during our sample
period|October 2007 to April 2008. The results indicate that the average investor's RRA
increases after experiencing a negative housing wealth shock, with an estimated elasticity of
 1:82. Under reasonable assumptions about the relationship between housing and total wealth
during this period, the point estimates imply that the curvature of the value function increases
after a negative wealth shock. This is consistent with investors exhibiting decreasing Relative
Risk Aversion, and with theories of habit formation (as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), and
incomplete markets (as in Guvenen (2009)).8
A novel feature of our estimation approach is that it disentangles the measurement of risk
aversion from investors' assessments about the systematic risk of LC loans. On average, the LC
systematic risk premium increases from 6.3% to 9.2% between the rst and last three months
of the sample, indicating that investors' priors on LC's systematic risk increase substantially
during the period.
respectively.
8These preference specications are also consistent with the empirical ndings in Calvet et al. (2009). Brun-
nermeier and Nagel (2008), on the other hand, nd support for CRRA.
5Overall, the results conrm that not accounting for preference heterogeneity and changes
in beliefs may bias estimates of the relationship between risk preferences and wealth. First,
the contrasting signs of the cross sectional and investor-specic wealth elasticities indicate that
inference on the elasticity of risk aversion to wealth from cross sectional data will be biased,
since risk taking behavior in the cross section of investors depends not only on the shape of the
utility function but also on the joint distribution of preferences and wealth.9 Second, our nding
that the expected return on LC systematic risk increases after house prices decline indicates that
wealth shocks are potentially correlated with general changes in investors' beliefs. This implies
that the share of risky assets may not be a valid measure for investor RRA in the presence of
wealth shocks. In our context, for example, inference based on the share of risky assets alone
would have overestimated the elasticity of risk aversion to wealth.
The LC environment allows us to test for estimation bias due to misspecication of investors'
beliefs. An investor in LC can choose her investment portfolio manually or through an optimiza-
tion tool. When the choice is manual, she selects loans by processing herself the information on
interest and idiosyncratic default rates provided on LC's website. When she uses the tool, the
tool processes this information for her, by providing all the possible ecient (minimum variance)
portfolios that can be constructed with the available loans. The investor then chooses among the
ecient portfolios according to her own risk preferences. Importantly, our estimation procedure
and the tool use the same information on risk and return, and the same modeling assumptions
regarding a common systematic component across all potential loans. Any bias due to mis-
specied beliefs will result in a wedge between the risk aversion estimates based on manual and
automatic choices. Instead, we obtain the same risk aversion estimates when investors choose
portfolios manually or through the tool, which validates our modeling assumption.
We provide additional validity to our estimates by testing whether the level and wealth
9Chiappori and Paiella (2008) nd the bias from the cross sectional estimation to be economically insignicant.
In their case, however, changes in agent's wealth are not exogenous, and risk aversion is measured through the
share of risky assets. Tanaka, Camerer and Nguyen (2010) use rainfall across villages in Vietnam as an instrument
for wealth and nd signicant dierence between the OLS and IV estimators. However, to obtain the elasticity
of the agent-specic risk aversion, they must assume that preferences are equal across villages otherwise.
6elasticity of risk aversion are consistent across dierent investors' decisions within LC. We test
the consistency of the estimated level of risk aversion using a revealed preference argument.
The median investor has in her portfolio only a subset of the loans available at the time of her
investment decision. We use the foregone loans to perform an out-of-sample validation of the
ARA estimate obtained from the loans in the portfolio. We conrm that including the foregone
loans in the portfolio would lower the investor's expected utility if her preferences are described
by the estimated ARA.
We also verify the consistency of the estimated elasticities of RRA to wealth by testing
the following predictions of the standard EU framework: when relative risk aversion decreases
(increases) in outside wealth, the share of wealth invested in LC will increase (decrease) in
outside wealth. Since our risk aversion measures are obtained solely from the composition of
each investment, these predictions can be tested out of sample by independently estimating
the elasticity of the total amount invested in LC to wealth. We nd that the implied signs of
the RRA and total investment elasticities, both in the cross section and within investor, are
consistent with the predictions above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Lending Club platform.
Section 3 solves the portfolio choice model and sets out our estimation strategy. Section 4
describes the data and the sample restrictions. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical
results and provides a test of the identication assumptions. Section 6 explores the relationship
between risk preferences and wealth. Section 7 tests the consistency of the investor preferences
across dierent decisions within LC. And Section 8 concludes.
2 The Lending Platform
Lending Club (LC) is an online U.S. lending platform that allows individuals to invest in portfo-
lios of small loans. The platform started operating in June 2007. As of May 2010, it has funded
$112,003,250 in loans and provided an average net annualized return of 9.64% to investors.10
10For the latest gures refer to: https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action.
7Below, we provide an overview of the platform and derive the expected return and variance of
investors' portfolio choices.
2.1 Overview
Borrowers need a U.S. SSN and a FICO score of 640 or higher in order to apply. They can
request a sum ranging from $1,000 to $25,000, usually to consolidate credit card debt, nance a
small business, or fund educational expenses, home improvements, or the purchase of a car.
Each application is classied into one of 35 risk buckets based on the FICO score, the
requested loan amount, the number of recent credit inquiries, the length of the credit history,
the total and currently open credit accounts, and the revolving credit utilization, according to
a pre-specied published rule posted on the website.11 LC also posts a default rate for each
risk bucket, taken from a long term validation study by TransUnion, based on U.S. unsecured
consumer loans. All the loans classied in a given bucket oer the same interest rate, assigned
by LC based on an internal rule.
A loan application is posted on the website for a maximum of 14 days. It becomes a loan
only if it attracts enough investors and gets fully funded. All the loans have a 3 year term with
xed interest rates and equal monthly installments, and can be prepaid with no penalty for the
borrower. When the loan is granted, the borrower pays a one-time fee to LC ranging from 1.25%
to 3.75%, depending on the credit bucket. When a loan repayment is more than 15 days late,
the borrower is charged a late fee that is passed to investors. Loans with repayments more than
120 days late are considered in default, and LC begins the collection procedure. If collection is
successful, investors receive the amount repaid minus a collection fee that varies depending on
the age of the loan and the circumstances of the collection. Borrower descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 1, panel A.
Investors in LC allocate funds to open loan applications. The minimum investment in a loan
is $25. According to a survey of 1,103 LC investors in March 2009, diversication and high
11Please refer to https://www.lendingclub.com/info/how-we-set-interest-rates.action for the details of the clas-
sication rule and for an example.
8returns relative to alternative investment opportunities are the main motivations for investing
in LC.12 LC lowers the cost of investment diversication inside LC by providing an optimization
tool that constructs the set of ecient loan portfolios for the investor's overall amount invested in
LC|i.e., the minimum idiosyncratic variance for each level of expected return (see Figure 1).13
In other words, the tool helps investors to process the information on interest rates and default
probabilities posted on the website into measures of expected return and idiosyncratic variance,
that may otherwise be dicult to compute for an average investor (these computations are
performed in Subsection 2.2).14 When investors use the tool, they select, among all the ecient
portfolios, the preferred one according to their own risk preferences. Investors can also use the
tool's recommendation as a starting point and then make changes. Or they can simply select
the loans in their portfolio manually.
Of all portfolio allocations between LC's inception and June 2009, 39.6% was suggested by
the optimization tool, 47.1% was initially suggested by the tool and then altered by the investor,
and the remaining 13.3% was chosen manually.15
Given two loans that belong to the same risk bucket (with the same idiosyncratic risk), the
optimization tool suggests the one with the highest fraction of the requested amount that is
already funded. This tie-breaking rule maximizes the likelihood that loans chosen by investors
are fully funded. In addition, if a loan is partially funded at the time the application expires,
LC provides the remaining funds.
12To the question \What would you say was the main reason why you joined Lending Club", 20% of respondents
replied \to diversify my investments", 54% replied \to earn a better return than (...)", 16% replied \to learn more
about peer lending", and 5% replied \to help others". In addition, 62% of respondents also chose diversication
and higher returns as their secondary reason for joining Lending Club.
13During the period analyzed in this paper, the portfolio tool appeared as the rst page to the investors. LC
has recently changed its interface and, before the portfolio tool page, it has added a stage where the lender can
simply pick between 3 representative portfolios of dierent risk and return.
14The tool normalizes the idiosyncratic variance into a 1{0 scale. Thus, while the tool provides an intuitive
sorting of ecient portfolios in terms of their idiosyncratic risk, investors always need to analyze the recommended
portfolios of loans to understand the actual risk level imbedded in the suggestion.
15We exploit this variation in Subsection 5.2 to validate the identication assumptions.
92.2 Return and Variance of the Risk Buckets
All the loans in a given risk bucket z = 1;:::;35 are characterized by the same scheduled monthly
payment per dollar borrowed, Pz, over the 3 years (36 monthly installments). The per dollar
scheduled payment Pz and the bucket specic default rate z fully characterize the expected
return and variance of per project investments, z and 2
z:
LC considers a geometric distribution for the idiosyncratic monthly survival probability of
the individual projects, Pr(T = ) = z (1   z)
 for T 2 [1;36]. The resulting expectation and


































where r is the risk-free interest rate. Although LC considers all risk to be idiosyncratic, our
estimations are not aected by the introduction of a non-diversiable risk component, Vz: The












z is the idiosyncratic component of the bucket's return Ri
z:
The idiosyncratic risk associated with bucket z decreases with the level of diversication
within the bucket; that is, the number of projects from bucket z in the portfolio of investor i;
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The expected return of an investment in bucket z is not aected by the number of loans in
the investor's portfolio and is equal to the expected return of the representative project in that
10bucket, z, which is constant across investors:16







The portfolio model in this section is based on Treynor and Black (1973). This framework
considers investors that, instead of simply holding a replica of the market portfolio, also hold
securities based on their own subjective insights.
Person-to-person lending markets, including LC, are not well known investment vehicles
among the general public. The decision to invest in LC depends on investors' knowledge of its
existence and their subjective expectation that LC is, indeed, a good investment opportunity.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that investors in LC have special insights, which explains why,
as we show later, their portfolio departs from just replicating the market; exactly the case
considered in Treynor and Black (1973).
This theoretical framework starts by recognizing that there is a high degree of co-movement
between securities, and specically to our case, the probability of default of all loans in LC
is potentially correlated with macroeconomic uctuations. We use Shape's Diagonal Model of
covariance among securities to capture this insight. It assumes that returns are related only
through a common systematic factor (i.e., market or macroeconomic uctuations). Under this
assumption, returns on LC loans can be decomposed into this common systematic factor and a
pure idiosyncratic component (we also refer to it as independent return).
The virtue of the model developed here is that the optimal portfolio depends only on the
expected return and variance of the idiosyncratic component. In other words, the optimal
amount invested in each LC loan does not depend on the return covariance with the investor's
overall risk exposure, nor does it require knowing the amount and characteristics of her outside
16The analysis in subsection 5.2 conrms that investors' beliefs about the probabilities of default do not dier
substantially from those posted on the website and, therefore, z and z are constant across investors.
11wealth. The optimality condition is such that the investor is indierent about allocating an
extra dollar in a riskier bucket: the extra idiosyncratic risk would be exactly compensated by
the increase in expected return, given the risk aversion of the investor. Based on this optimality
condition, and having computed the expected return and the variance of the loans idiosyncratic
risk in Subsection 2.2, we infer the investor specic risk aversion.
3.1 The Model
Each investor i chooses the share of wealth to be invested in the Z + 2 available securities: a
security m that represents the market portfolio, with return Rm; a security f, with risk-free
return equal to 1; and Z securities that are part of the active portfolio of the investor, with
return Rz.
We consider investments in LC as part of the active portfolio. We also allow for the existence
of unobservable outside active risky investments. That is, the 35 risk buckets in LC are denote













where ci stands for the investor's consumption and xf;xm; and fxzgZ
z=1 correspond to the share
of wealth, Wi, invested in the risk-free asset, the market portfolio, and the securities in the
active portfolio, respectively.
A projection of the return of each active security z = 1;:::;Z against the market gives two




z  Rm + ri
z (4)
We consider all risk buckets to have the same systematic component, and allow the prior
17In an alternative hypothesis, participants in LC do not have special insights and their investment in LC is
not part of the active component but only a fraction of the market portfolio. In that case, the composition of risk
buckets within LC is not given by the investor's risk aversion, as the optimal shares in the market portfolio are
constant across investors. This hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data in the results section.
12about the market sensitivity of LC returns to be investor specic. That is, for all z = 1;:::;35 :
i
z = i
L. This assumption is tested in Subsection 5.2.18














Z+1 is the total exposure to market risk, given both by the investor's direct holdings of
market portfolio, xi
m; and, indirectly, by her accumulation of market risk as a by-product of the









Following Treynor and Black (1973), we use Sharpe's Diagonal Model for covariance among
securities. It posits that the returns of the dierent investment opportunities are related to each
other only through their relationships with a common underlying factor. In the case of LC, the
loans in the program are assumed to be related to other securities only through the market's
eect on LC systematic risk. That is, the independent returns, dened in equation (4), are
uncorrelated.
Assumption 1. Sharpe's Diagonal Model19







To grasp the intuition behind this assumption consider, for example, how an increase in
macroeconomic risk (i.e., nancial crisis) is captured in the model. Macro uctuations, which
can trigger correlated defaults across buckets, represent an underlying common factor. Such
a common factor is reected in the systematic component of equation (4) and can vary across
investors and time.
18Note that under this assumption, the prior about the systematic risk Vz introduced in Subsection 2.2 is







2  var [Rm], for all z = 1;:::;35:
19Allowing a time dimension, the independent returns are also uncorrelated across time. That is, the portfolio
choices within LC are time-independent.
13Under assumption 1, our theoretical framework transforms the original investor budget con-
straint in equation (3) into the portfolio in equation (5), composed of a risk-free asset and Z +1
mutually independent securities. The investor is constrained to non-negative positions in all the































A rst-order linearization of the rst order condition around expected consumption results






















Note that, even when LC projects are aected by market uctuations, the optimal investment
in bucket z is independent of market risk considerations, or the volatility of the investor's
securities outside LC. This is because the holding of market portfolio, xZ+1 in equation (6),
optimally adjusts to account for the indirect market risk imbedded in LC or any other security
in the active portfolio of the investor. The optimal LC portfolio depends only on the investor's
risk aversion, and the expectation and variance of the independent return of each bucket z.
Rewriting investor-specic idiosyncratic risk in terms of the common parameter z, com-






expected return E [Rz], common across investors, computed in equation (2), we derive our main






20The minimum investment per loan is $25. This limit results in discrete intervals over which the number of
projects nanced, n
i
z, is unaltered by a marginal change in xz. The following rst order condition characterizes
the optimal portfolio within these discrete intervals.
14then for all z 2 Ai :

















The parameter ARAi corresponds to the Absolute Risk Aversion. It captures the extra ex-
pected return needed to leave the investor indierent when taking extra risk. The parameter i
collects the systematic component of the LC investment, which is constant across buckets. We
estimate this parameter as a person-specic constant (the constant is investment-specic when
investors make multiple portfolio choices). Thus, our estimation procedure does not require the
computation of the LC portfolio covariance with the market. Our main estimation procedure
exploits only the active risk buckets (z 2 Ai); we show in Subsection 7.1 that the estimated risk
preferences are consistent with those implied by the forgone buckets (z = 2 Ai).
We show in Appendix A that the same equation characterizes the optimal LC portfolio
and allows recovering the curvature of the utility function under three alternative preference
specications: 1) when investors are averse to losses in their overall wealth, 2) an extreme version
of narrow framing in which investors' preferences within LC are independent from their attitude
towards risk in other settings, and 3) when investor utility depends in a non-separable way on
both the overall wealth level and the income ow from specic components of the portfolio (for
example, as in Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006), and Cox and
Sadiraj (2006)).
The expected lifetime wealth of the investors is unknown and we therefore cannot compute
the Relative Risk Aversion (RRA).21 However, for the purpose of comparing our estimates with
21Although we cannot compute RRA, in Section 6 we infer its elasticity with respect to wealth, based on the
15results from laboratory experiments, we follow that literature and dene a relative risk aversion
based solely on the income generated by investing in LC (income-based RRA), which we denote
 (see, for example, Holt and Laury (2002)):












L is the total investment in LC, Ii







is the expected return









4 Data and Sample
Our sample covers the period between October 2007 and April 2008. Below we provide summary
statistics of the investors' characteristics and their portfolio choices, and a description of the
sample construction.
4.1 Investors
For each investor we observe the home address zip code, veried by LC against the checking
account information, and age, gender, marital status, home ownership status, and net worth, ob-
tained through Acxiom, a third party specialized in recovering consumer demographics. Acxiom
uses a proprietary algorithm to recover gender from the investor names, and matches investor
names and home addresses to available public records to recover age, marital status, home own-
ership status, and an estimate of net worth. Such information is available at the beginning of
the sample.
Table 1, panel B, shows the demographic characteristics of the LC investors. The average
investor in our sample is 43 years old, 8 years younger than the average respondent in the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). As expected from younger investors, the proportion of
married participants in LC (56%) is lower than in the SCF (68%). Men are over-represented
elasticity of ARA: RRA;W = ARA;W + 1.
16among participants in nancial markets, they account for 83% of the LC investors; similarly, the
faction of male respondents in the SCF is 79%. In terms of income and net worth, investors in LC
are comparable to other participants in nancial markets, who are typically wealthier than the
median U.S. households. The median net worth of LC investors is estimated between $250,000
and $499,999, signicantly higher then the median U.S. household ($120,000 according to the
SCF), but similar to the estimated wealth of other samples of nancial investors. Korniotis and
Kumar (2010), for example, estimate the wealth of clients in a major U.S. discount brokerage
house in 1996 at $270,000.
To obtain an indicator of housing wealth, we match investors' information with the Zillow
Home Value Index by zip code. The Zillow Index for a given geographical area is the value of the
median property in that location, estimated using a proprietary hedonic model based on house
transactions and house characteristics data, and it is available at a monthly frequency. Figure
2 shows the geographical distribution of the 1,624 zip codes where the LC investors are located
(Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico excluded). Although geographically disperse, LC investors
tend to concentrate in urban areas and major cities. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of
median house values on October 2007 and their variation during the sample period|October
2007 to April 2008.
4.2 Sample Construction
We consider as a single portfolio choice all the investments an individual makes within a calendar
month.22 The full sample contains 2,168 investors, 5,191 portfolio choices, which results in 50,254
investment-bucket observations. To compute the expected return and idiosyncratic variance of
the investment-bucket in equations (2) and (1), we use as the risk free interest rate, the 3-year
yield on Treasury Bonds at the time of the investment. Table 2, panel A, reports the descriptive
statistics of the investment-buckets. The median expected return is 12.2%, with an idiosyncratic
22This time window is arbitrary and modifying it does not change the risk aversion estimates. We chose a
calendar month for convenience, since it coincides with the frequency of the real estate price data that we use to
proxy for wealth shocks in the empirical analysis.
17variance of 3.6%. Panel B, describes the risk and return of the investors' LC portfolios. The
median portfolio expected return in the sample is 12.2%, almost identical to the expectation
at the bucket level, but the idiosyncratic variance is substantially lower, 0.0054%, due to risk
diversication across buckets.
Our estimation method imposes two requirements for inclusion in the sample. First, es-
timating risk aversion implies recovering two investor specic parameters from equation (8).
Therefore, a point estimate of the risk aversion parameter can only be recovered when a port-
folio choice contains more than one risk bucket.
Second, our identication method relies on the assumption that all projects in a risk bucket
have the same expected return and variance. Under this assumption investors will always prefer
to exhaust the diversication opportunities within a bucket, i.e., will prefer to invest $25 in
two dierent loans belonging to bucket z instead of investing $50 in a single loan in the same
bucket. It is possible that some investors choose to forego diversication opportunities if they
believe that a particular loan has a higher return or lower variance than the average loan in the
same bucket. Because investors' private insights are unobservable to the econometrician, such
deviations from full diversication will bias the risk aversion estimates downwards. To avoid
such bias we exclude all non-diversied components of an investment. Thus, the sample we base
our analysis on includes: 1) investment components that are chosen through the optimization
tool, which automatically exhausts diversication opportunities, and 2) diversied investment
components that allocate no more than $50 to any given loan.
After imposing these restrictions, the analysis sample has 2,168 investors and 3,745 portfolio
choices. The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample are shown in Table 2, column 2.
As expected, the average portfolio in the analysis sample is smaller and distributed across a
larger number of buckets than the average portfolio in the full sample. The average portfolio
expected return is the same across the two samples, while the idiosyncratic variance in the
analysis sample is smaller. This is expected since the analysis sample excludes non-diversied
investment components.
18In the wealth analysis, we further restrict the sample to those investors that are located in zip
codes where the Zillow Index is computed. This reduces the sample to 1,806 investors and 3,145
portfolio choices. This nal selection does not alter the observed characteristics of the portfolios
signicantly (Table 2, column 3). To maintain a consistent analysis sample throughout the
discussion that follows, we perform all estimations using this nal subsample unless otherwise
noted.
5 Risk Aversion Estimates
Our baseline estimation specication is based on equation (8). We allow for an additive error
term, such that for each investor i we estimate the following equation:








There is one independent equation for each active bucket z in the investor's portfolio. The
median portfolio choice in our sample allocates funding to 10 buckets, which provides us with
multiple degrees of freedom for estimation. We estimate the parameters of equation (12) with
Ordinary Least Squares.
Figure 3 shows four examples of portfolio choices. The vertical axis measures the expected
return of a risk bucket, E [Rz], and the horizontal axis measures the bucket variance weighted by
the investment amount, Wixi
z2
z=ni
z. The slope of the linear t is our estimate of the absolute
risk aversion and it is reported on the top of each plot.
The error term captures deviations from the ecient portfolio due to the $25 constraint
for the minimum investment, measurement errors by investors, and real or perceived private
information. The OLS estimates will be unbiased as long as the error component does not vary
systematically with bucket risk. We discuss and provide evidence in support of this identication
assumption below.
195.1 Results
The descriptive statistics of the estimated parameters of equation (8) for each portfolio choice
are presented in Table 3. The average estimated ARA across all portfolio choices is 0.0368.
Investors exhibit substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion, and its distribution is left skewed:
the median ARA is 0.0439 and the standard deviation 0.0246. This standard deviation overesti-
mates the standard deviation of the true ARA parameter across investments because it includes
the estimation error that results from having a limited number of buckets per portfolio choice.
Following Arellano and Bonhomme (2009), we can recover the variance of the true ARA by sub-
tracting the expected estimation variance across all portfolio choices. The calculated standard
deviation of the true ARA is 0.0237, indicating that the estimation variance is small relative to
the variance of risk aversion across investments.23 The range of the ARA estimates is consistent
with the estimates recovered in the laboratory. Holt and Laury (2002), for example, obtain
ARA estimates between 0.003 and 0.109, depending on the size of the bet.
The experimental literature often reports the income-based RRA, dened in equation (11).
To compare our results with those of laboratory participants, we report the distribution of the
implied income-based RRA in Table 3. The mean income-based RRA is 2.85 and its distribution
is right-skewed (median 1.62). This parameter scales the measure of absolute risk aversion
according to the lottery expected income; therefore, it mechanically increases with the size of the
bet. Table 3 reports the distribution of expected income from LC. The mean expected income
is $130, substantially higher than the bet in most laboratory experiments. Not surprisingly,
although the computed ARA in experimental work is typically larger than our estimates, the
income-based RRA parameter is smaller, ranging from 0.3 to 0.52 (see for example Chen and
Plott (1998), Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2002), Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003), and Goeree
and Holt (2004)). Our results are comparable to Holt and Laury (2002), who also estimate risk
















where the rst term is the variance of the OLS ARA point estimates across all investments, and the second term
is the average of the variance of the OLS ARA estimates across all investments.
20aversion for agents facing large bets and (implicitly) nd income-based RRA similar to ours,
1.2. Finally, Choi et al. (2007) report risk premia with a mean of 0.9, which corresponds to an
income-based RRA of 1.8 in our setting. That paper also nds right skewness in their measure
of risk premia.
Our ndings imply that the high levels of risk aversion exhibited by experimental subjects
extrapolate to actual small-stake investment choices. Rabin and Thaler (2001) and Rabin and
Thaler (2002) emphasize that such levels of risk aversion with small stakes are dicult to rec-
oncile, within the expected utility framework over total wealth, with the observable behavior of
agents in environments with larger stakes. This suggests that EU framework on overall wealth
cannot describe agents behavior in our environment. We show in the Appendix that the ARA
estimated here describes the curvature of the utility function in other preference frameworks
that are consistent with observed risk behavior over small and large stake gambles (Barberis
and Huang (2001) and Cox and Sadiraj (2006)). In such alternate preference specications,
agents' ARA depends on, both, the level of initial wealth and the income generated by the
gamble. This implies that the estimated level of ARA may change with the expected income
of investments. Nevertheless, the elasticity of ARA with respect to investor's wealth, our focus
in the next section, is consistent across dierent investment decisions and levels of expected
income in these frameworks. We provide evidence in Section 7 that our conclusions regarding
the relationship between investor risk aversion and wealth extrapolates to other decisions within
LC.
The parameter , dened in equation (9), captures the systematic component of LC. In
our framework, the systematic component is driven by the common covariance between all LC
bucket returns and the market, L. The average estimated  is 1.086, which indicates that the
average investor requires a systematic risk premium of 8.6%. The estimated  presents very
little variation in the cross section of investors (coecient of variation 2.7%), when compared
to the variation in the ARA estimates (coecient of variation of 67%).24 Note that our ARA
24As with the ARA, the estimation variance is small relative to the variance across investments. The standard
deviation of ^  is 0.0269, while the standard deviation of  after subtracting the estimation variance is 0.0260.
21estimates are not based on this risk premium; instead, they are based on the marginal premium
required to take an innitesimally greater idiosyncratic risk.
Table 4 presents the average and standard deviation of the estimated parameters by month.
The average ARA increases from 0.032 during the rst three months, to 0.039 during the last
three. This average time series variation is potentially due to heterogeneity across investors as
well as within investor variation, since not all investors participate in LC every month. The
analysis in the next section disentangles the two sources of variation.
The estimated s imply that the average systematic risk premium increases from 6.3% to
9.2% between the rst and last three months of the sample period. Note that the LC web page
provides no information on the systematic risk of LC investments. Thus, this change is solely
driven by changes in investors' beliefs about the potential correlation between the likelihood
of default of LC loans and aggregate macroeconomic shocks (covariance between LC returns
and market returns, L), or about the expected market risk premium (E [Rm]). This pattern
indicates that wealth shocks are potentially correlated with changes in investors' beliefs about
risk and return on nancial assets. Thus, we cannot infer the elasticity of RRA to wealth by
observing changes in the share of risky assets after a wealth shock, as they may be simply
reecting changes in beliefs about the underlying distribution of risky returns. Our proposed
empirical strategy in the next section overcomes this identication problem.
5.2 Belief Heterogeneity and Bias: The Optimization Tool
Above we interpret the observed heterogeneity of investor portfolio choices as arising from dif-
ferences in risk preferences. Such heterogeneity may also arise if investors have dierent beliefs
about the risk and returns of the LC risk buckets. Note that dierences in beliefs about the
systematic component of returns will not induce heterogeneity in our estimates of the ARA. This
type of belief heterogeneity will be captured by variations in  across investors. The evidence in
the previous section suggests that investors have relatively common priors about this systematic
component of the returns, i.e., common priors about LC's beta, L.
22However, the parameter  will not capture heterogeneity of beliefs that aects the relative risk
and expected return across buckets. This is the case if investors believe the market sensitivity
of returns to be dierent across LC buckets, i.e. if i
z 6= i
L for some z = 1;:::;35; or if investors'
priors about the stochastic properties of the buckets idiosyncratic return dier from the ones
computed in equations (1) and (2), i.e. Ei [Rz] 6= E [Rz] or i
z 6= z for some z = 1;:::;35. In
such cases, the equation characterizing the investor's optimal portfolio is given by:







































Two features of the LC environment allow us to estimate the magnitude of the overall bias
from these sources. First, LC posts on its website an estimate of the idiosyncratic default
probabilities for each bucket. Second, LC oers an optimization tool to help investors diversify
their loan portfolio. The tool constructs the set of ecient loan portfolios, given the investor's
total amount in LC |i.e., the minimum idiosyncratic variance for each level of expected return.
Investors then select, among all the ecient portfolios, the preferred one according to their own
risk preferences. Importantly, the tool uses the same modeling assumptions regarding investors'
beliefs that we use in our framework: the idiosyncratic probabilities of default are the ones
posted on the website and the systematic risk is common across buckets, i.e. z = L.25
Thus, we can measure the estimation bias by comparing, for the same investment, the ARA
estimates obtained independently from two dierent components of the portfolio choice: the
loans suggested by the tool and those chosen manually. If investors' beliefs do not deviate
systematically across buckets from the information posted on LC's website and from the as-
sumptions of the optimization tool, we should nd investor preferences to be consistent across
the two measures. Note that our identication assumption does not require that investors agree
with LC assumptions. It suces that the dierence in beliefs does not vary systematically across
25See Appendix B for the derivation of the ecient portfolios suggested by the optimization tool.
23buckets. For example, our estimates are unbiased if investors believe that the idiosyncratic risk
is 20% higher than the one implied by the probabilities reported in LC, across all buckets. Note,
moreover, that our test is based on investors' beliefs at the time of making the portfolio choices.
These beliefs need not to be correct ex post.
For each investment, we independently compute the risk aversion implied by the compo-
nent suggested by the optimization tool (Automatic buckets) and the risk aversion implied by
the component chosen directly by the investor (Non-Automatic buckets). Figure 4 provides an
example of this estimation. Both panels of the gure plot the expected return and weighted id-
iosyncratic variance for the same portfolio choice. Panel A includes only the Automatic buckets,
suggested by the optimization tool. Panel B includes only the Non Automatic buckets, chosen
directly by the investor. The estimated ARA using the Automatic and Non-Automatic bucket
subsamples are 0.048 and 0.051 respectively for this example.
We perform the independent estimation above for all portfolio choices that have at least
two Automatic and two Non-Automatic buckets. To verify that investments that contain an
Automatic component are representative of the entire sample, we compare the extreme cases
where the entire portfolio is suggested by the tool and those where the entire portfolio is chosen
manually. The median ARA is 0.0440 and 0.0441 respectively, and the mean dierence across
the two groups is not statistically signicant at the standard levels. This suggests that our focus
in this subsection on investments with an Automatic component is representative of the entire
investment sample.
Table 5, panel A, reports the descriptive statistics of the ARA estimated using the Auto-
matic and the Non-Automatic buckets. The average ARA is virtually identical across the two
estimations (Table 5, columns 1 and 2), and the means are statistically indistinguishable at
the 1% level. This implies that, if there is a bias our ARA estimates induced by dierences in
beliefs, its mean across investments is zero. Column 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the
investment-by-investment dierence between the two ARA estimates. The mean is zero and the
distribution of the dierence is concentrated around zero, with kurtosis 11.72 (see Figure 5).
24This implies that the bias is close to zero not only in expectation, but investment-by-investment.
These results suggest that investors' beliefs about the stochastic properties of the loans in LC
do not dier substantially from those posted on the website. They also suggest that investors'
choices are consistent with the assumption that the systematic component is constant across
buckets. Overall, these ndings validate the interpretation that the observed heterogeneity
across investor portfolio decisions is driven by dierences in risk preferences.
In Table 5, panels B and C, we show that the dierence in the distribution of the estimated
ARA from the automatic and non-automatic buckets is insignicant both during the rst and
second half of the sample period. This nding is key for interpreting the results in the next
section, where we explore how the risk aversion estimates change in the time series with changes
in housing prices. There, we interpret any observed time variation in the ARA estimates as a
change in investor risk preferences over time.
Table 5, columns 4 through 6, show that the estimated risk premia, , also exhibit almost
identical mean and standard deviations when obtained independently using the Automatic and
Non-Automatic investment components. The mean dierence is not statistically dierence at
the 1% condence level. This suggests that our estimates of the risk premium are unbiased.26
It is worth reiterating that these ndings do not imply that investors' beliefs about the
overall risk of investing in LC do not change during the sample period. On the contrary, the
observed average increase in the estimated systematic risk premium in Table 4 is also observed
in panels B and C of Table 5:  increases by 2.5 percentage points between the rst and second
halves of the sample. The results in Table 5 imply that changes in investors' beliefs are fully
accounted for by a common systematic component across all risk buckets and, thus, do not bias
our risk aversion estimates.
26In Appendix B we show that a bias in the risk premia estimate may arise because the optimization tool's
suggestion is potentially suboptimal relative to the one implied by condition (8). The intuition is that, for any
given return, condition (8) minimizes the variance of the investor's entire risky portfolio, while the optimization
tool minimizes the variance of the LC portion of her portfolio only. The results imply that the inclusion of the
Automatic component of investments does not bias our estimations and further validates the conclusions of this
section.
256 Risk Aversion and Wealth
This section explores the relationship between investors' risk taking behavior and wealth. We
estimate the elasticity of ARA with respect to wealth, and use it to obtain the elasticity of RRA
with respect to wealth, based on the following expression:
RRA;W = ARA;W + 1; (13)
where RRA;W and ARA;W refer to the wealth elasticities of RRA and ARA, respectively. For
robustness, we also estimate the elasticity of the income-based RRA in equation (11), ;W.
We exploit the panel dimension of our data and estimate these elasticities, both, in the cross
section of investors and, for a given investor, in the time series. In the cross section, wealthier
investors exhibit lower ARA and higher RRA when choosing their portfolio of loans within LC;
we refer to these elasticity estimates with the superscript xs to emphasize that they do not
represent the shape of individual preferences (i.e., xs
ARA;W, xs
RRA;W, xs
;W). And, in the time
series, investor specic RRA increases after experiencing a negative wealth shock; that is, the
preference function exhibits decreasing RRA. The contrasting signs of the cross sectional and
investor-specic wealth elasticities indicate that preferences and wealth are not independently
distributed across investors.
6.1 Wealth and Wealth Shock Proxies
Below, we describe our proxies for wealth in the cross section of investors, and for wealth shocks
in the time series. Since the bulk of the analysis uses housing wealth as a proxy for investor
wealth, we focus the discussion in this section on the subsample of investors that are home-
owners.27
27None of the results in this section is statistically signicant in the subsample of investors that are renters.
This is expected since housing wealth and total wealth are less likely to be correlated for renters, particularly in
the time series. However, this is also possibly due to lack of power, since only a small fraction of the investors in
our sample are renters.
266.1.1 Cross Section
We use Acxiom's imputed net worth as of October 2007 as a proxy for wealth in the cross
section of investors. As discussed in Section 4, Acxiom's imputed net worth is based on a
proprietary algorithm that combines names, home address, credit rating, and other data from
public sources. To account for potential measurement error in this proxy, we use a separate
indicator for investor wealth in an errors-in-variable estimation: median house price in the
investor's zip code at the time of investment. Admittedly, house value is an imperfect indicator
wealth; it does not account for heterogeneity in mortgage level or the proportion of wealth
invested in housing. Nevertheless, as long as the measurement errors are uncorrelated across the
two proxies, a plausible assumption in our setting, the errors-in-variable estimation provides an
unbiased estimate of the cross-sectional elasticity of risk aversion to wealth.
The errors-in-variables approach works in our setting because risk preferences are obtained
independently from wealth. If, for example, risk aversion were estimated from the share of
risky and riskless assets in the investor portfolio, this estimate would inherit the errors in the
wealth measure. As a result, any observed correlation between risk aversion and wealth could
be spuriously driven by measurement errors. This is not a concern in our exercise.
6.1.2 Wealth Shocks
House values dropped sharply during our sample period. Since housing represents a substantial
fraction of household wealth in the U.S., this decline implied an important negative wealth shock
for home-owners.28 We use this source of variation, to estimate the wealth elasticity of investor-
specic risk aversion in the subsample of home-owners that invest in LC. In this subsample the
average zip code house price declines 4% between October 2007 and April 2008.29
The drop in house value is an incomplete measure of the change in the investor overall wealth.
28According to the Survey of Consumer Finances of 2007, the value of the primary residence accounts for
approximately 32% of total assets for the median U.S. family (see Bucks, Kennickel, Mach and Moore (2009)).
29In addition, the time series house price variation is heterogeneous across investors: the median house price
decline is 3.6%.
27It is important, then, to analyze the potential estimation bias introduced by this measurement
error. Any time-invariant measurement error or unobserved heterogeneity across investors is
captured by the investor xed eect and does not aect our elasticity estimates. However, the
estimate of the wealth elasticity of risk aversion will be biased if the percentage change in wealth
is dierent from the drop in house values. If the drop in house prices is disproportionately large
relative to the change in overall wealth, our estimates of the elasticity will be biased towards
zero. And, alternatively, if the percentage decline in house values underestimates the change in
the investor's total wealth, then the wealth elasticity of risk aversion will be overestimated (in
absolute value). Finally, if the measurement error in the computation of the wealth shock is not
systematic, we will estimate the elasticity with the classic attenuation bias, in which case our
estimates provide a lower bound for the elasticities of risk aversion to wealth. In subsection 6.3,
we analyze how our conclusions are aected under dierent types of measurement error.
6.2 Cross-Sectional Evidence
We begin by exploring non-parametrically the relationship between the risk aversion estimates
and our two wealth proxies for the cross section of home-owner investors in our sample. Figure 6
plots a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing of the risk aversion measure. The horizontal
axis measures the (log) net worth and the (log) median house price in the investor's zip code at
the time of the portfolio choice. ARA is decreasing in both wealth proxies, while income-based
RRA is increasing.
Turning to parametric evidence, we estimate the cross sectional elasticity of ARA to wealth
using the following regression:
ln(ARAi) = 0 + 1 ln(NetWorthi) + !i: (14)
The left hand side variable is investor i's average (log) ARA, obtained by averaging the
ARA estimates recovered from the investor's portfolio choices during our sample period. The
right-hand side variable is investor i's imputed net worth. Thus, the estimated 1 corresponds
28to the cross-sectional wealth elasticity of ARA, xs
ARA;W.
To account for measurement error in our wealth proxy we estimate specication (14) in an
errors-in-variables model by instrumenting imputed net worth with the average (log) house value
in the zip code of residence of investor i during the sample period. Since the instrument varies
only at the zip code level, in the estimation we allow the standard errors in specication (14) to
be clustered by zip code.
Table 6 shows the estimated cross sectional elasticities with OLS and the errors-in-variables
model (panels A and B respectively). Our preferred estimates from the errors-in-variables model
indicate that the elasticity of ARA to wealth in the cross section is -0.059 and statistically
signicant at the 1% condence level (Table 6, column 1). The non-parametric relationship
is conrmed: wealthier investors exhibit a lower ARA. The OLS elasticity estimate is biased
towards zero. This attenuation bias is consistent with classical measurement error in the wealth
proxy.
The estimated ARA elasticity and equation (13) imply that the wealth-based RRA elasticity
to wealth is positive, b xs
RRA;W = 0:94. Column 2 shows the result of estimating specication
(14) using the income-based RRA as the dependent variable. The income-based RRA increases
with investor wealth in the cross section, and the point estimate, 0.12, is also signicant at the
1% level. The sign of the estimated elasticity coincide with that implied by the ARA elasticity.
Overall, the results consistently indicate that the RRA is larger for wealthier investors in the
cross section.
6.3 Within-Investor Estimates
The above elasticity, obtained from the variation of risk aversion and wealth in the cross section,
can be taken to represent the form of the utility function of the representative investor only under
strong assumptions. Namely, when the distributions of wealth and preferences in the population
are independent.30 To identify the functional form of individual risk preferences we estimate the
30Chiappori and Paiella (2008) formally prove that any within-investor elasticity of risk aversion to wealth can
be supported in the cross section by appropriately picking such joint distribution.
29ARA elasticity using within-investor time series variation in wealth:
ln(ARAit) = i + 2 ln(HouseV alueit) + !it: (15)
The left-hand side variable is the estimated ARA for investor i in month t. The right-hand side
variable of interest is the (log) median house value of the investor's zip code during the month
the risk aversion estimate was obtained (i.e., the month the investment in LC takes places). The
right-hand side of specication (15) includes a full set of investor dummies as controls. These
investor xed eects (FE) account for all cross sectional dierences in risk aversion levels. Thus,
the elasticity 2 recovers the sensitivity of ARA to investor-specic shocks to wealth.
By construction, the parameter 2 can be estimated only for the subsample of investors that
choose an LC portfolio more than once in our sample period. Although the average number of
portfolio choices per investor is 1.8, the median investor chooses only once during our analysis
period. This implies that the data over which we obtain the within investor estimates using
(15) comes from less than half of the original sample. To insure that the results below are
representative for the full investor sample, we also show the results of estimating specication
(15) without the investor FE to corroborate that the conclusions of the previous section are
unchanged when estimated on the subsample of investors that chose portfolios more than once.
Table 7 reports the parameter estimates of specication (15), before and after including the
investor FE (Panels A and B respectively). The FE results represent our estimated wealth
elasticities of ARA, ARA;W. The sign of the estimated within-investor elasticity of ARA to
wealth (column 1) is the same as in the cross section: absolute risk aversion is decreasing in
investor wealth.
Equation (13) and the estimated wealth elasticity of ARA imply a negative wealth-based
RRA to wealth changes for a given investor, RRA;W, of -1.82. Column 2 reports the result of
estimating specication (15) using the income-based RRA as the dependent variable. The point
estimate, -4.18, also implies a negative relationship between this alternative measure of RRA
and wealth. These results consistently suggest that investors' utility function exhibits decreasing
30relative risk aversion.
Measurement error in our proxy for wealth is unlikely to change this conclusion. Classical
measurement error would imply that the point estimate is biased towards zero; this estimate is
therefore a lower bound (in absolute value) for the actual wealth elasticity of risk aversion. The
(absolute value) of the elasticity could be overestimated if the percentage decline in house values
underestimates the change in the investor's total wealth. However, for error in measurement
to account for the sign of the elasticity, the overall change in wealth has to be three times
larger than the percentage drop in house value.31 This is unlikely in our setting since stock
prices dropped 10% and investments in bonds had a positive yield during our sample period.32
Therefore, even if measurement error biases the numerical estimate, it is unlikely to aect our
conclusions regarding the shape of the utility function.
The observed positive relationship between investor RRA and wealth in the cross section
from the previous section changes sign once one accounts for investor preference heterogeneity.
The comparison of the estimates with and without investor FE of panels A and B in Table 7
conrms it. This implies that investors preferences and wealth are not independently distributed
in the cross section. Investors with dierent wealth levels may have dierent preferences, for
example, because more risk averse individuals made investment choices that made them wealth-
ier. Alternatively, an unobserved investor characteristic, such as having more educated parents,
may cause an investor the be wealthier and to be more risk averse. The results indicate that
characterizing empirically the shape of the utility function requires, rst, accounting for such
heterogeneity.
31We estimate the elasticity of ARA with respect to changes in house value to be {2.82. Let W be overall
wealth and H be house value, then: ARA;W =
d ln ARA
d ln W =  2:82
d ln H
d ln W . The wealth elasticity of RRA is positive
only if ARA;W >  1, which requires
d ln W
d ln H > 2:82.
32Between October 1, 2007 and April 30, 2008 the S&P 500 Index dropped 10% and the performance of U.S.
investment grade bond market was positive |Barclays Capital U.S. Aggregate Index increased approximately
2%.
317 Consistency of Preferences
In this section we show that the estimated level and wealth elasticity of risk aversion consistently
extrapolate to other investors' decisions. For that, we exploit the dierent dimensions of the
investment decision in LC: the total amount to invest in LC, the loans to include in the portfolio,
and the portfolio allocation across these loans.
7.1 Foregone Risk Buckets
The investor-specic ARA is estimated in Section 5 based on the allocation of funds across the
risk buckets included in her portfolio. Yet, investors select in their portfolio only a subset of the
buckets available. We show in this subsection that including the foregone buckets in the median
investor's portfolio would lower her expected utility given her estimated ARA. Thus, investors'
estimated level of risk aversion is consistent with the preferences revealed by their selection of
loans.
The median investor in the analysis sample assigns funds to 10 out of 35 risk buckets (see
Table 2, panel B). Our empirical specication (12) characterizes the allocation of the median
investment among the 10 active buckets without using the corresponding equations describing
the choice of the foregone 25 buckets. We use these conditions to develop a consistency test for
investors' choices.
For each investor i, let Ai be the set of active risk buckets. The optimal portfolio model
described in Section 3, predicts that, for all foregone risk buckets z = 2 Ai, the rst order condition
(8), evaluated at the minimum investment amount per project of $25, is negative|i.e. the
nonnegative constraint is binding. The resulting linearized condition for all z = 2 Ai is:
focforegone = E [Rz]   i   ARAi  25  2
z < 0
We test this prediction by calculating focforegone for every foregone bucket using the parameters
n
 = ^ i;ARAi = [ ARA
io
estimated with specication (12). To illustrate the procedure, suppose
32that investor i chooses to allocate funds to 10 risk buckets. From that choice we estimate a
constant ^ i and an absolute risk aversion [ ARA
i
using specication (12). For each of the 25
foregone risk buckets we calculate focforegone above. Then we repeat the procedure for each
investment in our sample and test whether focforegone is negative.
Using the procedure above we calculate 85,366 values for focforegone. The average value
for the rst order condition evaluated at the foregone buckets is  0:000529, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0:0000839. This implies that the 95% condence interval for focforegone is
[ 0:00069; 0:00036]. The null hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero is rejected with a
t =  6:30. If we repeat this test investment-by-investment, the null hypothesis that mean of
focforegone is zero is rejected for the median investment with a t =  1:99.
These results conrm that the risk preferences recovered from the investors' portfolio choices
are consistent with the risk preferences implied by the foregone investment opportunities in LC.
7.2 Amount Invested in LC
In this subsection we test whether the cross-sectional and within-investor elasticities of risk
aversion to wealth consistently extrapolate to the investor's decision of how much to invest
in LC. Our model in Section 3 delivers testable implications for the relationship between an
investor's risk preferences and her overall holdings of the ecient LC portfolio. Namely, when
relative risk aversion decreases (increases) in wealth, then the share of wealth invested in LC will
increase (decrease) in wealth (see Appendix C). We can use these predictions, both, to provide
an independent validation for the results on the elasticity of risk aversion to wealth based on the
risk aversion estimates obtained in Section 5, and to explore the connection between investors'
risk preferences across dierent types of choices.
We test the above implications by estimating specications (14) and (15) using the (log)
amount invested in LC as dependent variable. Table 6 and 7 (column 3) report the estimated
cross sectional and within investor elasticities.
We nd that the investment amount is increasing with investor wealth in the cross section
33(Table 6, column 3). The elasticity is smaller than one, which suggests that the ratio of the
investment to wealth is decreasing. These estimates are consistent with decreasing ARA and
increasing RRA cross sectional elasticities reported in Tables 6. That is, agents that exhibit
larger risk aversion in their portfolio choice within LC are also characterized by lower risk
tolerance when choosing how much to invest in the program.
The estimated wealth elasticity of total investment in LC is positive and grater than one
when we add investor xed eects (Table 6 column 3). This implies that, for a given investor, the
ratio of investment to wealth is increasing. These results mirror those in the previous subsection
concerning the estimates of the elasticity of investor specic ARA with respect to changes in
wealth. We can therefore conclude that changes in wealth have same qualitative eect on the
investors' attitudes towards risk, both, when deciding her portfolio within LC and when choosing
how much to allocate in LC relative to other opportunities.
Providing evidence of this link is impossible in a laboratory environment where the invest-
ment amount is exogenously xed by the experiment design. Our results suggest that preference
parameters obtained from marginal choices can plausibly explain decision making behavior in
broader contexts.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we estimate risk preference parameters and their elasticity to wealth based on the
actual nancial decisions of a panel of U.S. investors participating in a person-to-person lending
platform. The average absolute risk aversion in our sample is 0.0368. We also measure the
relative risk aversion based on the income generated by investing in LC (income-based RRA).
We nd a large degree of heterogeneity, with an average income-based RRA of 2.85 and a
median of 1.62. These ndings are similar to those obtained in laboratory studies; they provide
an external validation in a real life investment environment to the estimates obtained from
34laboratory experiments.33
We exploit the panel dimension of our data and estimate the elasticity of ARA and RRA
with respect to wealth, both, in the cross section of investors and, for a given investor, in the
time series. In the cross section, wealthier investors exhibit lower ARA and higher RRA when
choosing their portfolio of loans within LC. In the time series, investor specic RRA increases
after experiencing a negative wealth shock; that is, the preference function exhibits decreasing
RRA. The contrasting signs of the cross sectional and investor-specic wealth elasticities indicate
that investors' preferences and wealth are not independently distributed in the cross section.
Therefore, to empirically characterize the shape of the utility function, one needs to take the
properties of the joint distribution of preferences and wealth into account.
Parallel to experimental results, in settings where agents maximize expected utility over total
wealth, the observed levels of risk aversion inside LC are dicult to reconcile with reasonable
choices in large stake environments.34 Our ndings are consistent with a behavioral model in
which utility depends (in a non-separable way) on both the overall wealth level and the ow of
income from specic components of agent's portfolio. This is in line with Barberis and Huang
(2001) and Barberis et al. (2006), which propose a framework where agents exhibit loss aversion
over changes in specic components of their overall portfolio, together with decreasing relative
risk aversion over their entire wealth. In the expected utility framework, Cox and Sadiraj (2006)
propose a utility function with two arguments (income and wealth) where risk aversion is dened
over income, but it is sensitive to the overall wealth level. Since our estimates of risk aversion refer
to the local curvature of preferences over changes in income, they characterize risk preferences
over income irrespectively of the form of the utility function over total wealth. Indeed, we show
in the Appendix that our estimates of risk aversion characterize the local curvature of preferences
over changes in income for dierent preference frameworks |i.e., expected utility, loss aversion,
33For estimation of risk aversion in real life environments, see also Jullien and Salanie (2000), Jullien and Salanie
(2008), Bombardini and Trebbi (2007), Cohen and Einav (2007), Harrison, Lau and Towe (2007a), Chiappori,
Gandhi, Salanie and Salanie (2008), Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008), Chiappori, Gandhi,
Salanie and Salanie (2009), and Barseghyan, Prince and Teitelbaum (2010).
34This is commonly referred to as the Rabin's Critique (Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001)). See also
Rubinstein (2001) for an alternative interpretation of this phenomenon within the expected utility theory.
35and narrow framing{.
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38Appendix
A Alternative Utility Frameworks
A.1 Loss Aversion over Changes in Overall Wealth
Consider the following preferences, which exhibit loss aversion with coecient  around a bench-
mark consumption c
U =   E [u(c)jc < c]  Pr[c < c] + E [u(c)jc > c]  Pr[c > c]]
Since LC is a negligible part of the investor's wealth and the return is bounded between
default and full repayment of all loans in the portfolio (see Table 2), the distribution of con-
sumption is virtually unaected by the realization of the independent component of bucket z.
Then, we dene !  c Wxzrz, which is independent from rz, and approximate the distribution
of c with the distribution of !: F(c)  F(!). Under this approximation, a marginal increase
in xz does not aect the distribution F(!) and the rst order condition that characterizes the
investor's portfolio choice is:
foc(xz) :   E

u0(c)(rz   1)j! < c

 Pr[! < c] + E

u0(c)(rz   1)j! > c

 Pr[! > c] = 0
Since ! and rz are independently distributed, a rst order linearization of expected marginal





= u0(E[cj! < c])E[rz] + u00(E[cj! < c])E [(!   E[!] + rz   E[rz])rzj! < c]
= u0(E[cj! < c])E[rz] + u00(E[cj! < c])var[rz]
Replacing, the rst order condition is approximated by:
E[Rz] =  + ] ARA  Wxz  var[rz]
This condition is equivalent to the one in the body of the paper, irrespectively of the value of
c or the existence of multiple kinks. However, the absolute risk aversion estimated using this
equation is not the one evaluated around expected consumption, as in the body of the paper.
Instead, it is a weighted average of the absolute risk aversions evaluated in the intervals dened
by the loss aversion kinks:
] ARA    ARA  + (1   )  ARA+
where :  
F[c]
F[c] + (1   F[c])
ARA    
u00(E [cjc < c])
u0(E [cjc < c])
ARA+   
u00(E [cjc > c])
u0(E [cjc > c])
39Still, as in the body of the paper, the optimal investment in a risk bucket z is not explained by
rst order risk aversion; it is given by its expected return and second order risk aversion over
the volatility of its idiosyncratic component.
A.2 Narrow Framing





k = 1;:::;K corresponds to the dierent sub-portfolios over which the investor exhibits local
preferences. yk = IkRk is the income generated by the portfolio component k, given by Ik and
Rk, the total amount allocated in the sub-portfolio and the corresponding return.
Consider LC to be one of these sub-portfolios, so for k = L, the investor chooses the shares
fxzg35
z=1 to be invested in each risk bucket so to maximize her utility over LC, for a given amount





















  L = 0
where L is the multiplier on the budget constraint
P35
z=1 xz = 1.
A linearization around expected return results in the following expression:
u0




xzE [(Rz   E [Rz])  Rz] = L
From equation (4) and assuming z = L, the returns in LC are decomposed into a common
systematic factor LRm and an idiosyncratic component rz. Moreover, under the Diagonal
Sharpe's Ratio in Assumptions 1, returns from dierent buckets co-move only through their
market component. That is:
for all z 6= z0 : E [(Rz0   E [Rz0])Rz] = 2
L  var[Rm]
E [(Rz   E [Rz])Rz] = 2
L  var[Rm] + var[rz]
Replacing, the optimal portfolio within LC is characterized by the following expression:
u0
L (E [yL])  E [Rz] + u00
L (E [yL])  IL
 
2
L  var[Rm] + xz  var[rz]

= L
Rearranging terms, this leads to the same empirical equation as in the body of the paper:
E [Rz] =  + ARAL  ILxz  var[rz] (A.1)
40ILxz is the total amount invested in bucket z, equivalent to Wxz in the body of the paper. Note
that the systematic component is common to all risk buckets and therefore does not alter the
portfolio composition within LC. It is recovered by the investor specic constant, which is given




+ ARAL  IL  2
L  var[Rm]
If investors behave according to these preferences the ARA obtained from this empirical equation








We show in the paper this extreme version of narrow framing does not represent the prefer-
ences of the investors in LC. We show that the shape of the utility that follows from investors'
choices within LC extrapolates to other decisions. In particular, the amount invested in LC:
IL. Moreover, follows from the expression above, that if investors exhibit narrow framing as
presented here, realizations of returns in other sub-portfolios k 6= L do not aect risk preferences
ARAL. We show that this is not the case; changes in the value of the investors' house aect the
preferences exhibited within LC. However, more general forms of narrow framing are consistent
with investors' choices, as explained in the following subsection.
A.3 Preferences over Income and Wealth







where, as before, k = 1;:::;K corresponds to the dierent sub-portfolios over which the investor
exhibits local preferences, with income given by the amount invested in k and the respective
return, yk = IkRk. The LC sub-portfolio is denoted k = L, with income dened as in the
previous subsection: yL = IL
P35
z=1 xzRz. W is the investor's overall wealth.
The rst order condition that characterizes the active bucket z within LC is similar to the










  L = 0
where uL corresponds to the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the income
generated by the sub-portfolio L, and L is the multiplier over the constraint
P35
z=1 xz = 1. The
linearization of this expression around the vector of expected income fE[yk]gK
k=1 is equivalent
to expression (A.1):
E [Rz] =  + ARAL  ILxz  var[rz]



















  Ik  kL  var[Rm]
41where ukL is the cross derivative of the utility function with respect to the incomes generated
by components k and L. The absolute risk aversion recovers the investor's preferences over












This behavioral model, in which utility depends (in a non-separable way) on, both, the overall
wealth level and the ow of income from specic components of the agent's portfolio, is in line
with Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis et al. (2006), which propose a framework where
agents exhibit loss aversion over changes in specic components of their overall portfolio, together
with decreasing relative risk aversion over their entire wealth, consistent with the ndings of this
paper. In the expected utility framework, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) propose a utility function with
two arguments (income and wealth) where risk aversion is dened over changes in income but it
is sensitive to the overall wealth level. Their suggested functional form implies
@ARAk
@yk < 0, which
can reconcile low levels of ARA over high stake gambles and high ARA found in experimental
literature when expected income from the lottery is small. Moreover, their functional form
implies
@ARAk
@W < 0, consistent with the ndings in this paper.
B Optimization Tool
Those investors who follow the recommendation of the optimization tool make a sequential
portfolio decision. First, they decide how much to invest in the entire LC portfolio. And second,
they choose the desired level idiosyncratic risk in the LC investment, from which the optimization
tool suggests a portfolio of loans.
The rst decision, how much to invest in LC, follows the optimal portfolio choice model in
Section 3, where the security z = L refer to the LC overall portfolio. The optimal investment
in LC is therefore given by equation (7):
E [rL]   1 = ARAi  Wixi
L  var[rL] (A.2)
(E [rL]   1)=var[rL] corresponds to the investor's preferred risk-return ratio of the her LC
portfolio. Although this ratio is not directly observable, we can infer it from the Automatic
portfolio suggested by the optimization tool.
The optimization tool suggests the minimum variance portfolio given the investor's choice
of idiosyncratic risk exposure. The investor marks her preferences by selecting a point in the
[0;1] interval: 0 implies fully diversied idiosyncratic risk (typically only loans from the A1 risk
bucket) and 1 is the (normalized) maximum idiosyncratic risk. Figure 1 provides two snapshots
of the screen that the lenders see when they make their choice.
For each point on the [0;1] interval, the website generates the ecient portfolio of risk
buckets. The loan composition at the interior of each risk bucket exhausts the diversication
opportunities, with the constraint that an investment in a given loan cannot be less than $25.



















var[rz] and E [Rz] are the idiosyncratic variance and expected return of the (optimally diver-
sied) risk bucket z, computed in equations (1) and (2); and E [RL] is the demanded expected
return of the entire portfolio.
Although the optimization tool operates under the assumption that LC has no systemic
component, i.e., L = 0, the suggested portfolio also minimizes variance for a given overall
expected independent return, E [rL]. That is, the problem is not aected by subtracting a
common systematic component, LE [Rm] on both sides of the expectation constraint. The
resulting ecient portfolio suggested by the website satises the following condition for every
active bucket z, for which sz > 0:
sz = i
0




That is, the share of LC investment allocated in bucket z is proportional to the bucket's mean
variance ratio. And the proportionality factor, i
0, represents the risk preferences of the investor,




E [rL]   i
1
(A.4)
It is possible to recover, from the Automatic portfolio composition, the investor's preferred
risk-return ratio. Combining equations (A.3) and (A.4) with the optimal LC investment condi-
tion (A.2), we obtain the following expression:
E [Rz] =
 
LE [Rm] + i
1





E [rL]   i
1





z is the total amount invested in bucket z, which is equivalent to Wixi
z in
Section 3.
Our estimates from the specication (12) may be biased by the inclusion of the Automatic
choices. The magnitude of the bias is:
biasi =
E [RL]   i
A









1 + LE [Rm]
i
N  1 + LE [Rm]
We nd that the intercepts estimated from Automatic and Non-Automatic choices (A and N)
43are equal (see Table 5). We therefore conclude that including Automatic choices does not bias
our results.
C Investment Amount
Limiting, for simplicity, the investor's outside options to the risk free asset and the market











where RL is the overall return of the ecient LC portfolio. The ecient LC portfolio composition
is constructed renormalizing the optimal shares in equation (8): RL =
PZL
z=1 e xzRz where e xz 
xz=
P35
z=1 xz. A projection of the return RL against the market, parallel to equation (4), gives
the investor's market sensitivity, i
L, and independent return:
RL = i
L  Rm + rL
The investor's budget constraint can be rewritten as ci = Wi

xi









L incorporates the market risk imbedded in the LC portfolio.
A linearization of the rst order condition around expected consumption results in the fol-
lowing optimality condition:
E [RL] = i + ARAi  Ii
L  var[rL]
where Ii
L is the total investment in LC, Ii
L = xi
LWi. The composition of the LC portfolio is
optimal; then, dierentiating the expression above with respect to outside wealth and applying







ARA and RRA refer to absolute and wealth-based relative risk aversion: ARA   
u00(E[ci])
u0(E[ci])
and RRA   
u00(E[ci])
u0(E[ci]) W: We obtain the following testable implications:
Result 1. If the absolute risk aversion, ARA, decreases (increases) in outside wealth, then the
amount invested in LC, IL, increases (decreases) in outside wealth.
Result 2. If the wealth-based RRA decreases (increases) in outside wealth, then the share of
wealth invested in LC, IL=W; increases (decreases) in outside wealth.
We test these implications by estimating specications (14) and (15) using the (log) amount
invested in LC.
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Figure 1: Portfolio Tool Screen Examples for a $100 Investment 
 









The website provides an optimization tool that suggests the efficient portfolio of loans for the investor's preferred risk 
return trade-off, under the assumption that loans are uncorrelated with each other and with outside investment 
opportunity. The risk measure is the variance of the diversified portfolio divided by the variance of a single investment 
in the riskiest loan available (as a result it is normalized to be between zero and one). Once a portfolio has been formed, 
the investor is shown the loan composition of her portfolio on a new screen that shows each individual loan (panel B). 
In this screen the investor can change the amount allocated to each loan, drop them altogether, or add others. 
The website provides an optimization tool that suggests the ecient portfolio of loans for the investor's
preferred risk return trade-o, under the assumption that loans are uncorrelated with each other and
with outside investment opportunity. The risk measure is the variance of the diversied portfolio divided
by the variance of a single investment in the riskiest loan available (as a result it is normalized to be
between zero and one). Once a portfolio has been formed, the investor is shown the loan composition of
her portfolio on a new screen that shows each individual loan (panel B). In this screen the investor can
change the amount allocated to each loan, drop them altogether, or add others.
Figure 1: Portfolio Tool Screen Examples for a $100 Investment
45 
In color: zip codes with Lending Club investors. The color intensity reects the total dollar amount
invested in LC by investors in each zip code.
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of Lending Club Investors
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Each plot represents one investment in our sample. The plotted points represent the risk and weighted return of each of 
the buckets that compose the investment. The dots are labeled with the corresponding risk classification of the bucket. 
The vertical axis measures the expected return of a risk bucket, and the horizontal axis measures the bucket variance 
weighted by the total investment in that bucket. The slope of the linear fit is our estimate of the absolute risk aversion 
(ARA). The intersection of this linear fit with the vertical axis is our estimate for the risk premium (Theta). 
Each plot represents one investment in our sample. The plotted points represent the risk and weighted
return of each of the buckets that compose the investment. The dots are labeled with the corresponding
risk classication of the bucket. The vertical axis measures the expected return of a risk bucket, and the
horizontal axis measures the bucket variance weighted by the total investment in that bucket. The slope
of the linear t is our estimate of the absolute risk aversion (ARA). The intersection of this linear t with
the vertical axis is our estimate for the risk premium ().
Figure 3: Examples of Risk Return Choices and Estimated RRA
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Figure 4: Example of Risk Aversion Estimation Using Automatic and Non-Automatic 
Buckets for the Same Investment 
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Both plots represent allocations to risk buckets of the same actual investment. As in Figure 3, the plotted points 
represent the risk and weighted return of each of the buckets that compose the investment. Panel A shows the buckets 
that were chosen by the portfolio tool (Automatic), and panel B shows buckets directly chosen by the investor (Non-
Automatic). The slope of the linear fit represents the absolute risk aversion (ARA), and its intersection with the vertical 
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Both plots represent allocations to risk buckets of the same actual investment. As in Figure 3, the plotted points 
represent the risk and weighted return of each of the buckets that compose the investment. Panel A shows the buckets 
that were chosen by the portfolio tool (Automatic), and panel B shows buckets directly chosen by the investor (Non-
Automatic). The slope of the linear fit represents the absolute risk aversion (ARA), and its intersection with the vertical 
axis represents the risk premium (Theta).  
(b) Non-Automatic Buckets
Both plots represent allocations to risk buckets of the same actual investment. As in Figure 3, the plotted
points represent the risk and weighted return of each of the buckets that compose the investment. Panel
A shows the buckets that were chosen by the portfolio tool (Automatic), and panel B shows buckets
directly chosen by the investor (Non-Automatic). The slope of the linear t represents the absolute risk
aversion (ARA), and its intersection with the vertical axis represents the risk premium ().
Figure 4: Risk Aversion Estimation Example Using Automatic and Non-Automatic Buckets
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Difference in ARA and θ0 Estimates Obtained 
 from Automatic and Non-Automatic Buckets for the Same Investment 
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Difference between the estimate for ARA and θ0 obtained using buckets chosen directly by investors (Automatic) and 
buckets suggested by optimization tool (Non-Automatic), for the same investment.   
(a) ARA: Automatic and Non-Automatic Choices
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Figure 5: Distribution of the Difference in ARA and θ0 Estimates Obtained 
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Difference between the estimate for ARA and θ0 obtained using buckets chosen directly by investors (Automatic) and 
buckets suggested by optimization tool (Non-Automatic), for the same investment.   
(b) : Automatic and Non-Automatic Choices
Dierence between the estimate for ARA and  obtained using buckets chosen directly by investors
(Non-Automatic) and buckets suggested by optimization tool (Automatic), for the same investment.
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(b) Income-Based RRA and Wealth
Subsample: home-owners. The vertical axis plots a weighted local second degree polynomial smoothing of
the risk aversion measure. The observations are weighted using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth
of 0.75. The horizontal axis measures the (log) net worth and the (log) median house price at the investor's
zip code at the time of the portfolio choice, our two proxies for investor wealth.
Figure 6: Risk Aversion and Wealth in the Cross Section
50Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median
A. Borrower Characteristics
FICO score 694.3 38.2 688.0
Debt to Income 0.128 0.076 0.128
Monthly Income ($) 5,427.6 5,963.1 4,250.0
Amount borrowed ($) 9,223.7 6,038.0 8,000.0
B. Investor Characteristics
Male 83% 100%
Age 43.4 15.0 40.0
Married 56% 100%
Home Owner 75% 100%
Net Worth, Imputed ($1,000) 663.0 994.4 375.0
Median House Value in Zip Code ($1,000) 397.6 288.0 309.6
% Change in House Price, 10-2007 to 04-2008 -4.0% 5.8% -3.6%
Sources: Lending Club, Acxiom, and Zillow. October 2007 to April 2008. FICO scores and debt to
income ratios are recovered from each borrower's credit report. Monthly incomes are self reported during
the loan application process. Amount borrowed is the nal amount obtained through Lending Club.
Lending Club obtains investor demographics and net worth data through a third party marketing rm
(Acxiom). Acxiom uses a proprietary algorithm to recover gender from the investor's name, and matches
investor names, home addresses, and credit history details to available public records to recover age,
marital status, home ownership status, and net worth. We use investor zip codes to match the LC data
with real estate price data from the Zillow Home Value Index. The Zillow Index for a given geographical
area is the median property value in that area.
Table 1: Borrower and Investor Characteristics
51Sample/Subsample: All Investments Diversied investments With real estate data
(1) (2) (3)
Mean S.D Median Mean S.D Median Mean S.D Median
A. Unit of observation: investor-bucket-month
(N = 50,254) (N = 43,662) (N = 37,248)
Investment ($) 302.8 2,251.4 50.0 86.0 206.9 50.0 90.1 220.5 50.0
N Projects in Bucket 1.9 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.0
Interest Rate 12.89% 2.98% 12.92% 12.91% 2.96% 12.92% 12.92% 2.97% 12.92%
Default Rate 2.77% 1.45% 2.69% 2.78% 1.45% 2.84% 2.79% 1.45% 2.84%
E(PV $1 investment) 1.122 0.027 1.122 1.122 0.027 1.123 1.122 0.027 1.123
Var(PV $1 investment) 0.036 0.020 0.035 0.027 0.020 0.022 0.036 0.020 0.035
B. Unit of observation: investor-month
(N = 5,191) (N = 3,745) (N = 3,145)
Investment 2,932 28,402 375 1,003 2,736 375 1,067 2,934 400
N Buckets 9.7 8.7 7.0 11.7 8.4 10.0 11.8 8.5 10.0
N Projects 18.8 28.0 8.0 23.3 28.9 14.0 23.8 29.5 14.0
E(PV $1 investment) 1.121 0.023 1.121 1.121 0.021 1.121 1.121 0.021 1.121
Var(PV $1 investment) 0.0122 0.0159 0.0054 0.0052 0.0065 0.0025 0.0066 0.0070 0.0038
Each observation in panel A represents an investment allocation, with at least 2 risk buckets, by investor i in risk bucket z in month t.
In panel B, each observation represents a portfolio choice by investor i in month t. An investment constitutes a dollar amount allocation
to projects (requested loans), classied in 35 risk buckets, within a calendar month. Loan requests are assigned to risk buckets according
to the amount of the loan, the FICO score, and other borrower characteristics. Lending Club assigns and reports the interest rate and
default probability for all projects in a bucket. The expectation and variance of the present value of $1 investment in a risk bucket is
calculated assuming a geometric distribution for the idiosyncratic monthly survival probability of the individual loans and independence
across loans within a bucket. The sample in column 2 excludes portfolio choices in a single bucket and non-diversied investments. The
sample in column 3 also excludes portfolio choices made by investors located in zip codes that are not covered by the Zillow Index.





Mean 0.03679 1.086 130.1 2.85
sd 0.02460 0.027 344.3 3.62
p1 -0.00837 1.045 4.11 -0.16
p10 0.01126 1.059 8.08 0.28
p25 0.02271 1.075 16.0 0.56
p50 0.04395 1.086 45.9 1.62
p75 0.04812 1.094 111.1 3.66
p90 0.05293 1.105 297.1 7.29
p99 0.08562 1.157 1,255.1 17.18
N 3,145 3,145 3,145 3,145
Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) and intercept  obtained through the OLS estimation of the following
relationship for each investment:








where the left (right) hand side variable is expected return (idiosyncratic variance times the investment
amount) of the investment in bucket z. The income based Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) is the estimated
ARA times the total expected income from the investment in Lending Club. pN represents the Nth
percentile of the distribution.




2007m10 0.028 1.057 173.3 1.229
(0.020) (0.014) (608.5) (0.980)
2007m11 0.032 1.065 111.3 1.195
(0.018) (0.013) (337.6) (0.952)
2007m12 0.037 1.066 78.5 1.446
(0.016) (0.013) (199.8) (1.527)
2008m1 0.036 1.083 175.9 2.774
(0.031) (0.040) (522.8) (3.676)
2008m2 0.040 1.089 123.3 3.179
(0.022) (0.018) (305.9) (3.906)
2008m3 0.037 1.097 146.4 3.841
(0.025) (0.023) (288.0) (4.302)
2008m4 0.039 1.089 63.9 2.011
(0.026) (0.023) (109.8) (2.275)
Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) and intercept  obtained through the OLS estimation of the following
relationship for each investment:








where the left (right) hand side variable is expected return (idiosyncratic variance times the investment
amount) of the investment in bucket z. The income based Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) is the estimated
ARA times the total expected income from the investment in Lending Club. Standard deviations in
parenthesis.
Table 4: Mean risk aversion and systematic risk premium by month
54ARA 
Automatic Non-Automatic  Automatic Non-Automatic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Full Sample (n = 227)
0.0368 0.0356 -0.0012 1.079 1.080 0.001
(0.0215) (0.0194) (0.0204) (0.0209) (0.0226) (0.0213)
B. Subsample: October-December 2007 (n = 74)
0.0355 0.0340 -0.0016 1.062 1.063 0.001
(0.0235) (0.0192) (0.0223) (0.0132) (0.0193) (0.0168)
C. Subsample: January-April 2008 (n = 153)
0.0374 0.0364 -0.0011 1.087 1.089 0.002
(0.0206) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0232)
Descriptive statistics of the Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) and  obtained as in Table 3, over the
subsample of investments where the estimates can be obtained separately using Automatic (buckets
suggested by optimization tool) and Non-Automatic (buckets chosen directly by investor) bucket choices
for the same investment. The mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of both estimates and the
dierence for the same investment are shown for the full sample and for 2007 and 2008 separately. The
mean dierences are not signicantly dierent from zero in any of the samples.
Table 5: Estimates from Automatic and Non-Automatic Buckets
55Dependent Variable: ARA Income based Investment First Stage
(in logs) RRA log (Net Worth)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. OLS
log (Net Worth) -0.009** 0.022*** 0.035***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.010
Observations (investors) 1,514 1,514 1,514
B. Errors-in-Variables (Instrument: House Value)
log (Net Worth) -0.059*** 0.123*** 0.203***
(0.019) (0.031) (0.038)
log (House Value) 1.664***
(0.146)
Observations (investors) 1,261 1,261 1,261 1,261
Estimated elasticity of risk aversion to wealth in the cross section. Panel A presents the OLS estimation
of the between model and Panel B presents the errors-in-variables estimation using the median house
value in the investor's zip code as an instrument for net worth. The dependent variables are the (log)
absolute risk aversion (column 1), income-based relative risk aversion (column 2), and investment amount
in LC (column 3), averaged for each investor i across all portfolio choices in our sample. The right hand
side variable is the investor (log) net worth (from Acxiom). Column 4 reports the rst stage of the
instrumental variable regression: the dependent variable is (log) net worth and the right hand side
variable is the average (log) median house price in the investor's zip code (from Zillow). Standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the zip code level. *, **, and *** indicate signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of condence, respectively.
Table 6: Risk Aversion and Wealth, Cross Section Estimates
56Dependent Variable: ARA Income based Investment
(in logs) RRA
(1) (2) (3)
A. No Fixed Eects
log (House Value) -0.166*** 0.192*** 0.367***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.070)
Risk Premium Controls Yes Yes Yes
Investor Fixed Eects No No No
R-squared 0.020 0.010 0.032
Observations 2,030 2,030 2,030
Investors 1,292 1,292 1,292
B. Investor Fixed Eects
log (House Value) -2.825* -4.815*** 1.290
(1.521) (1.611) (1.745)
Risk Premium Controls Yes Yes Yes
Investor Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared (adj) 0.008 0.011 0.001
Observations 2,030 2,030 2,030
Investors 1,292 1,292 1,292
Estimated investor-specic elasticity of risk aversion to wealth. The left hand side variables are the (log)
absolute risk aversion (column 1), income-based relative risk aversion (column 2), and investment amount
in LC (column 3), obtained for investor i for a portfolio choice in month t. The right hand side variables
are the (log) median house price in the investor's zip code in time t, and an investor xed eect (omitted).
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the zip code level. *, **, and *** indicate
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of condence, respectively.
Table 7: Risk Aversion and Wealth Shocks, Investor-Specic Estimates
57